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HOW MUCH DO YOU REALLY HAVE TO 
KNOW?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MENS REA 
REQUIREMENT OF 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2) 
KIRSTEN ENNIS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The average American is undoubtedly familiar with the 
decongestant Sudafed.  Often employed to treat symptoms of the 
common cold and allergies, Sudafed is a household name.  When 
most people purchase Sudafed at their local drug store, however, 
they are often unaware that their fellow customers may not be 
buying the medicine to nurse their cold symptoms.  In fact, many 
are not aware of the black market that exists for Sudafed.  The 
active ingredient in Sudafed, pseudoephedrine, is used in the 
manufacturing of methamphetamine, a highly addictive, illegal 
stimulant that typically causes neurological damage in its users.1  
Methamphetamine producers often purchase bulk quantities of 
pseudoephedrine, and the DEA is currently unaware of any other 
legitimate or black market use for large amounts of 
pseudoephedrine.2  To ensure that lawful chemicals that are 
readily available, such as pseudoephedrine, are not diverted into 
illegal channels such as methamphetamine production, Congress 
enacted 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).  This statute criminalizes the 
possession or distribution of certain chemicals when the 
defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that such 
chemicals would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.3  
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Binghamton University. The author 
thanks Professor Elaine Chiu for her help and guidance. 
1 See United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 766 (7th Cir. 2008). 
2 See id. at 767. 
3 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011); infra Part I.C (describing the history 
and purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “controlled 
substance” as “[a]ny type of drug whose possession and use is regulated by law, 
including a narcotic, a stimulant, or a hallucinogen.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378–
79 (9th ed. 2009). 
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A well-established maxim in criminal law is actus non facit 
reum, nisi mens sit rea, “an act does not make [its doer] guilty, 
unless the mind be guilty.”4  It is axiomatic in American criminal 
jurisprudence that punishment is proper only when an individual 
has committed the physical act and had the mental state 
required by the statute defining the crime.5  Certain crimes 
require that the defendant intended the result of his physical act, 
predicating conviction on the defendant’s subjective, or actual, 
objectives.6  Other crimes, however, focus on the mindset of the 
reasonable person in the defendant’s situation, allowing the 
prosecution to prove guilt based upon objective knowledge.7  
When drafting statutes, Congress often includes more than one 
requisite mental state, or mens rea; in such a case, a defendant 
may be found guilty if he possessed either of the named mentes 
reae.8  Title 21, section 841(c)(2) is one such statute, 
criminalizing the possession or distribution of certain chemicals 
when the defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, 
that the chemicals would be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance.9  Black market sellers of pseudoephedrine, or other 
chemicals used to make controlled substances, can be convicted of  
 
 
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990); see also, e.g., Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and 
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will 
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose 
between good and evil. 
Id. 
5 See id. at 251–52 (noting that criminal convictions are predicated on a 
defendant’s physical actions coupled with his mental thoughts). 
6 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 155 (5th ed. 
2009) (explaining that for the crimes of battery and murder, the prosecution must 
prove “the conscious object of the actor”). 
7 See id. at 275 (“The ‘reasonable man’ (or, sometimes, ‘ordinary man’) shows up 
throughout the criminal law and represents an objective standard by which the 
defendant’s conduct is measured.”). 
8 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West 2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . . .”); 
18 U.S.C. § 1111(c)(3) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse’ means intentionally or 
knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child.”); 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) 
(2006) (“[A]ny officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service” violates the 
statute if he or she “recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence[,] 
disregards any provision of this title.”). 
9 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2). For the definition of “controlled substance,” see supra 
note 3.  
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violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) if they do so knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that their purchasers will use the 
chemicals to produce a controlled substance.10 
To answer the question of whether a particular defendant 
violated 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), a court must ascertain the 
meaning of the requisite mens rea: “knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe.”  Specifically, the court must 
determine whether this phrase implicates an entirely subjective 
standard or, instead, allows a defendant’s conviction to be based 
on either subjective or objective knowledge of his purchaser’s 
intent.  This decision is often crucial in whether a defendant is 
found guilty, as a defendant who only possessed objective 
knowledge would be innocent in a jurisdiction that adopts a 
wholly subjective standard; the same defendant, however, would 
be convicted in a court that holds that guilt may be predicated on 
objective fault.11  Currently, the circuit courts have failed to 
adopt a uniform understanding of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s mens 
rea.12  A consistent interpretation is needed to ensure that a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence is not determined simply by the 
court in which he is tried. 
The varying interpretations of the mens rea of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) have been at issue in the circuit courts for a 
number of years.  While one circuit has held that the standard is 
wholly subjective, others have ruled that the statute’s language 
allows for either a subjective or objective finding of knowledge on 
the part of the defendant, and one circuit has failed to adopt a 
conclusive stance on the issue.13  This Note explores these 
conflicting interpretations of the mens rea requirement of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) and advocates for a mixed 
subjective/objective standard.  Part I describes the history and 
purpose of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
 
10 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2). 
11 Compare United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that while a reasonable person would have been aware that the 
defendant’s purchasers planned to use the pseudoephedrine to produce 
methamphetamine, the defendant did not have actual knowledge of their plan and 
thus, was innocent), with United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a defendant’s objective knowledge is sufficient to prove his guilt). 
12 See United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the circuit courts are split regarding the appropriate interpretation of “knowing 
or having reasonable cause to believe”).  
13 See infra Part II. 
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Control Act and specifically, the current language of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s requisite mens rea.  Part II discusses the 
competing interpretations of “knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe” in the circuit courts.  Finally, Part III argues 
that the correct view is an interpretation that is both subjective 
and objective.  It examines various tools of statutory 
interpretation, including legislative history, the maxim that a 
statute should be interpreted to give each word or phrase a 
distinct meaning, and the “mischief approach” to statutory 
construction.  
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
This Part explains how and why 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was 
enacted.  Section A describes the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, the first piece of legislation 
passed to suppress the drug problem in the United States and its 
relationship to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).  Section B discusses the 
Controlled Substances Act, the Act under which 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was eventually adopted.  Finally, Section C 
explains the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the legislation that 
authorized the enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). 
A. History and Purpose of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act 
In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that drug 
abuse posed a substantial threat to the safety of the United 
States.14  He emphasized that drug use had soared to an 
unprecedented high and urged that comprehensive legislation be 
enacted to quell the problem.15  Two years later, he declared a 
national “War on Drugs,”16 calling drug abuse in America “public 
 
14 See NPR.org, Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Apr. 2, 
2007 [hereinafter Timeline], http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=9252490 (providing a timeline of America’s fight against drugs over the 
past four decades). 
15 See id. (noting that between 1960 and 1967, the United States experienced a 
substantial rise in drug-related crimes). 
16 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (explaining that President Nixon 
declared the “War on Drugs” two years after taking office in 1969); Timeline, supra 
note 14. Essentially, the “War on Drugs” was an attempt by the United States 
government to stop drug production, distribution, and consumption in America by 
imposing harsh penalties for those who engaged in drug-related activities. See 
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enemy No. 1.”17  Citing the alarming levels of illegal drug 
manufacturing, use, and trafficking, President Nixon warned 
that drugs were ravaging the security and morale of society.18 
The resulting legislation was the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“CDAPCA”).19  As the 
Supreme Court recently noted, “Congress set out to enact 
legislation that would consolidate various drug laws . . . into a 
comprehensive statute, provide meaningful regulation over 
legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal 
channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the 
traffic in illicit drugs.”20  The Act is divided into three distinct 
sections, called “Titles.”21  Title I regulates preventive and 
therapeutic treatment for narcotics addicts via the Department of 
Health and Human Services,22 Title II criminalizes the 
possession and distribution of precursor chemicals to illicit drugs, 
as well as the manufacture of illegal substances,23 and Title III 
relates to the importation and exportation of controlled 
substances.24  Since 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was enacted under Title 
II, this Note will focus primarily on that Title. 
 
James A. Inciardi, American Drug Policy: The Continuing Debate, in THE DRUG 
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 4–5 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
17 Timeline, supra note 14. 
18 See David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: How a “Big Tent” 
Reform Became a Punitive Drug Law, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 11 
(2004). 
19 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
21 U.S.C.); see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 10 (referring to the CDAPCA as “the first 
campaign” of the “War on Drugs”); Edward J. Perez et al., Substance Abuse in 
America: Then and Now, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 365, 372 (2009) (noting that in 
1970, Congress repealed then-existing drug laws and substituted them with the 
CDAPCA). 
20 Raich, 545 U.S. at 10; see also Perez et al., supra note 19 (commenting that 
the CDAPCA was enacted to suppress the drug problem in the United States). 
21 See 84 Stat. at 1238, 1242, 1285; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 12 n.19 (noting 
that the Act is comprised of three separate titles). 
22 See 84 Stat. at 1238. 
23 See id. at 1264. A “precursor chemical” is a chemical used in the production of 
a certain drug. Lauren Grau, Cutting Off the Building Blocks to Methamphetamine 
Production: A Global Solution to Methamphetamine Abuse, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157, 
160 (2007). 
24 See 84 Stat. at 1285. 
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B. History and Purpose of the Controlled Substances Act 
Title II of the CDAPCA is also known as the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”).25  The CSA was enacted to tighten the 
government’s regulatory authority over the nation’s drug supply, 
both legal and illegal,26 in an attempt to suppress the drug 
problem in America.27  The Act empowers the Attorney General 
and Drug Enforcement Administration to manage and oversee 
drug control and enforcement.28 
Most notably, the CSA heavily regulates precursor chemicals 
that, while legal, are often used to produce illegitimate controlled 
substances.29  To halt the detrimental impact that narcotics were 
having on America’s well-being, Congress recognized the need to 
stop all transactions through which legal drugs were diverted to 
illegal distribution chains and used to manufacture controlled 
substances.30  Congress further explained that this goal could 
only be accomplished by reducing the availability of legal, 
precursor chemicals and in turn, adopted a “closed” regulatory 
scheme.31  In this “closed” scheme, the government controlled the 
production, sale, and use of narcotics and forbade anyone from 
engaging in such activities unless sanctioned by the CSA.32   
Congress divided a myriad of controlled substances into five 
different schedules; this division has been referred to as the 
“centerpiece” of the CSA.33  A substance was placed in a certain 
schedule after its safety and acceptability for use in medical 
treatment, potential for abuse, and psychological and physical 
 
25 Id. at 1242 (1970). A “legal drug” is one that may lawfully be possessed and 
sold, as long as “the appropriate license is obtained from the DEA, and applicable 
regulations are followed.” United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1263 n.1 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
26 See Joseph F. Spillane, Debating the Controlled Substances Act, 76 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 17, 17 (2004) (noting that the CSA provided the federal 
government with the authority to regulate numerous drugs). 
27 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12 (2005) (identifying one of the main 
objectives of the CSA as “conquer[ing] drug abuse”). 
28 Id. at 12 n.19. 
29 Id. at 12–13 (explaining that “Congress was particularly concerned with the 
need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to illicit channels”). 
30 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, at 71–72 (1970).  
31 Id. 
32 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13 (citing 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 844(a) (West 2011)). 
33 Perez et al., supra note 19. Congress defines a “controlled substance” as “a 
drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, 
or V.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2006 & Supp. II). 
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effects were determined.34  The CSA provides that new drugs 
may be added or removed from a schedule and drugs may be 
rescheduled after the Attorney General consults with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services.35 
C. History and Purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) 
1. The 1988 Amendment 
Under the Reagan administration, Congress amended Title 
II of the CSA via the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, thereby 
enacting 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).  The Act was passed to further 
inhibit the production, distribution, and use of illicit drugs.36  In 
his remarks on signing the bill, President Reagan explained that 
the Act would help the government to “close rank” on those who 
played a role in the manufacturing and distribution of drugs.37  
President Reagan further noted that the Act gave “a new sword 
and shield” to law enforcement officials by tightening regulations 
regarding drug-related offenses.38  The bill, referred to as “the 
most comprehensive Anti-Drug Abuse Act ever considered in the 
U.S. Congress” by Senator Byrd,39 sent a crystal clear message to 
 
34 Raich, 545 U.S. at 13. Schedule I drugs are characterized by having a high 
chance of abuse, having no recognized medical purpose, and being unsafe for use in 
medical treatments. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242, 
1247 (1970). Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, more commonly referred to as 
“MDMA” or ecstasy, is a schedule I substance. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS, 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, REGULATED CHEMICALS 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf (providing 
a list of scheduled chemicals); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 n.1 
(2007) (noting that methylenedioxymethamphetamine is popularly called “MDMA” 
or ecstasy). Schedule II drugs are likely to be abused and may cause the user to 
become psychologically or physically dependent on the drug but have an accepted 
medical purpose. 84 Stat. at 1247. Methamphetamine is currently a schedule II 
drug. Id. at 1250. 
35 Raich, 545 U.S. at 14–15; see also Perez et al., supra note 19, at 373 
(explaining that the CSA is complete with a “review mechanism” that provides for 
the introduction of new drugs or the reorganization of the current schedules). 
36 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-609, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
37 Remarks on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1521, 1522 (Nov. 18, 1988) (noting the necessity of the Act by explaining 
that “[a]rrests, convictions, and prison sentences” of those who sold and abused 
drugs had risen to unparalleled levels).   
38 Id. at 1523 (explaining that the ultimate goal of the Act was to make America 
drug-free). 
39 134 CONG. REC. 32632 (1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
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those involved in drug trafficking, warning them that the United 
States would no longer allow their behavior to continue.40  The 
legislation strengthened America’s law enforcement abilities, 
bolstered its interdiction capabilities, strengthened its effort to 
obliterate drug crops, and imposed more stringent penalties for 
possession and trafficking.41   
Section 401(d) of the CSA, which was later codified as 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c),42 was amended twice throughout the 
congressional proceedings and debates that surrounded this 1988 
Act.43  The first amendment read: 
Section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 841) 
is amended by striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu 
thereof the following new subsections: (d) Any person who 
knowingly or intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a 
listed chemical knowing that the listed chemical will be used to 
manufacture a controlled substance . . . .44 
Section 401 was again amended eight days later to read as  
it does today:  “(d) Any person who knowingly or 
intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical 
knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed 
chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance . . . .”45 
 
40 Id. (summarizing the message as follows: “Don’t do drugs. This country will no 
longer tolerate it”). 
41 Id. 
42 Until 2000, the present day 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was designated as 
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). See infra note 45. 
43 See 134 CONG. REC. 30,365 (1988) (proposing that the statutory language of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2) include “knowingly”); 134 CONG. REC. 33,191 (1988) (proposing, 
eight days later, that “having reasonable cause to believe” should also be included in 
the language). 
44 134 CONG. REC. 30,365 (1988) (emphasis added). 
45 134 CONG. REC. 33,191 (1988) (emphasis added); see also 
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011). Listed chemicals include precursor chemicals to 
controlled substances, such as methamphetamine and ecstasy. Such precursor 
chemicals include pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous, iodine, ethyl ether, acetic 
anhydride, and 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02 (2010); 
see also Oregon.gov, Clandestine Drug Lab Program, Chemicals Used in 
Methamphetamine Manufacture, http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/druglab/chemicals. 
shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous, 
iodine, ethyl ether, and acetic anhydride are precursors to methamphetamine); 
AbsoluteAstronomy, MDP2P, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/MDP2P 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (stating that 3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone is a 
precursor to ecstasy). In 2000, Congress amended section 401 of the Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841, “by redesignating subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) as 
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively,” without altering the statutory 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
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II. THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2) 
Whenever the government seeks to prosecute a defendant for 
an alleged crime, the government has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
requisite mens rea.46  For one to be found guilty of violating 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant knew or had reasonable cause to 
believe that the chemical he distributed would be used to make a 
controlled substance.47  Currently, the circuits are split regarding 
the meaning of the mens rea.48  While the Tenth Circuit has held 
that the statute requires the defendant to have subjective 
knowledge that the chemical would be used to manufacture a 
prohibited narcotic,49 the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have held that evidence of either actual knowledge or that a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s place would have known 
that the chemical would be used to produce a controlled 
substance is sufficient.50  The Seventh Circuit has failed to 
establish a conclusive standard.51 
 
language. Hillory J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 
2000, H.R. 2130, 106th Cong. § 9 (2000) (noting that the amendment was 
“technical”).  
46 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) (explaining that a criminal 
defendant is presumed innocent until the prosecution proves each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the defendant satisfied the 
statute’s mens rea requirement).  
47 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2). 
48 United States v. Khattab, 536 F.3d 765, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
there is a split amongst the circuits regarding the interpretation of “knowing or 
having reasonable cause to believe”). 
49 See United States v. Truong, 425 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) is wholly subjective); United 
States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
determining whether one has “reasonable cause to believe” is contingent upon the 
defendant’s actual knowledge). 
50 See United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“reasonable cause to believe” may be satisfied by either the defendant’s subjective or 
objective knowledge); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that “reasonable cause to believe” does not require actual knowledge but, 
instead, an inquiry into the mind of the reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) allows the 
government to prove that the defendant had either subjective or objective 
knowledge). 
51 See Khattab, 536 F.3d at 769 (explaining that the Seventh Circuit did not 
adopt either interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s mens rea requirement because 
the defendant’s actual knowledge made him guilty under either interpretation). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
1108 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1099   
This Part explores the varying interpretations of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)’s requisite mens rea.  Section A discusses 
the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation.  Section B explores how the 
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the mens 
rea requirement.  Finally, Section C discusses the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to not adopt a stance on the issue.  
A. A Court That Applies a Wholly Subjective Standard 
In United States v. Saffo,52 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the 
mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was entirely subjective, 
requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant possessed 
actual knowledge.  In Saffo, the defendant routinely sold 
pseudoephedrine to various wholesale distributors in several 
states;53 she was charged with, and convicted of, seven counts of 
pseudoephedrine distribution in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2).54  While Saffo admitted to selling large 
quantities of pseudoephedrine, she denied knowing that her 
purchasers planned on using the chemicals to manufacture 
methamphetamine.55  The court held that “having reasonable 
cause to believe” requires the government to prove something 
“akin to actual knowledge,” noting that a conviction should be 
based on the defendant’s guilty mind and not on the guilt of a 
hypothetical reasonable man.56  The court further explained that 
because “guilt is personal,” allowing a conviction based on the 
knowledge of the theoretical reasonable man would essentially be 
holding the defendant guilty under a negligence standard.57  
Saffo, however, was found to have actual knowledge because she 
had received a DEA “Red Notice” form that explained that 
pseudoephedrine is typically used in methamphetamine 
production and because drivers stopped with large quantities of 
pseudoephedrine were carrying her name and telephone 
number.58  Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s 
 
52 227 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2000).  
53 See id. at 1263–66. 
54 Id. at 1267. Saffo was charged and convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2), 
which was re-designated 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) when Congress enacted the Hillory J. 
Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000. See supra note 
45. 
55 See Saffo, 227 F.3d at 1272. 
56 Id. at 1269.  
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 1270.  
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
2010] HOW MUCH DO YOU REALLY HAVE TO KNOW? 1109 
conviction,59 holding that “knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe” is based solely on defendant’s subjective knowledge.60 
Five years later, in United States v. Truong,61 the Tenth 
Circuit, following Saffo, rejected the contention that the mens rea 
requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) allowed proof of either the 
defendant’s subjective or objective knowledge regarding his 
purchaser’s intent to manufacture a controlled substance.62  In 
Truong, the defendant, an employee at a Texaco gas station, 
repeatedly sold large quantities of pseudoephedrine63 but 
explained to the police that he did not know what would be done 
with the pills once he sold them.64  The court noted that the sales 
occurred “under unusual circumstances”—the defendant only 
accepted cash for the transactions, ensured that sales only 
occurred once the gas station was closed, placed the 
pseudoephedrine in a closed Styrofoam cup, and did not ring the 
sales into the cash register.65  The jury found the defendant 
guilty, and he appealed his conviction.66  On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit held that “knowing or reasonable cause to believe” is a 
wholly subjective standard, requiring the government to prove 
that the defendant actually knew the chemicals he distributed 
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance—in this 
case, methamphetamine.67  Relying on Saffo, the court reversed 
the defendant’s conviction.68  The court found that the 
government presented enough evidence to prove that the 





59 Id. at 1274. 
60 Id. at 1268. 
61 425 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005). 
62 See id. at 1289; see also United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133 
(2005) (holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) requires a 
wholly subjective inquiry and a conviction cannot be predicated upon the knowledge 
of a reasonable man in the defendant’s situation).  
63 Truong, 425 F.3d at 1284–85. 
64 Id. at 1285.  
65 Id. at 1286. 
66 Id. at 1288. 
67 Id. at 1289. The Court noted that the actual knowledge threshold may also be 
satisfied if the prosecution proves that the defendant had “something close” to 
subjective knowledge. Id. 
68 Id. at 1291. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
1110 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1099   
prove that he had actual knowledge of their specific intention to 
manufacture methamphetamine; therefore, the defendant did not 
satisfy the mens rea requirement.69 
B. Courts That Apply a Mixed Subjective/Objective Standard 
1. The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Tenth Circuit, ruling 
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) permitted 
evidence of either the defendant’s actual knowledge or the 
knowledge of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation.70  
In United States v. Galvan,71 officers monitoring the activity 
inside a Wal-Mart store observed the defendant purchasing three 
boxes of pseudoephedrine pills—the maximum amount one is 
allowed to purchase.72  The officers then followed the defendant 
to six other stores and watched as he left each store with a bag in 
hand.73  The defendant was arrested.74  Inside the defendant’s 
vehicle, the officers found two additional boxes of 
pseudoephedrine pills, as well as a number of pills hidden in a 
bag underneath the floorboard.75  In the district court, the 
defendant was convicted of one count of violating 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).76  Galvan did not deny his possession of 
pseudoephedrine but contended that the jury should be 
instructed that the statute requires actual knowledge.77  On 
appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not err 
 
69 Id. at 1290–91. Other cases illustrate situations in which the defendant was 
deemed to have had actual knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Buonocore, 416 
F.3d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant had actual knowledge 
because a recording disclosed the purchaser saying to the defendant, “the meth 
cooks must be cookin like crazy . . . I must have had a run, there’s a bunch of meth 
cooks in town, that’s what their [sic] using them for.”); United States v. Nguyen, 413 
F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant had actual knowledge 
because he received a DEA “Red Notice,” warning him that pseudoephedrine is often 
used in methamphetamine manufacturing, and a DEA agent expressly told 
defendant that “persons seeking to purchase large quantities of pseudoephedrine 
should be a ‘red flag’ for criminal activity”). 
70 United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). 
71 407 F.3d 954.  
72 Id. at 955. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 957. 
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in rejecting defendant’s proposed jury instructions.78  The 
defendant’s proffered jury instructions stated that having 
“reasonable cause to believe” requires the prosecution to prove 
the defendant’s subjective knowledge.79  The court rejected this 
instruction as erroneous, explaining that this interpretation of 
the statute’s mens rea requirement would render the “reasonable 
cause to believe” clause superfluous.80  The Eighth Circuit ruled 
that the district court was correct in interpreting the statute to 
avoid such redundancy and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.81  
2. The Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit, holding 
that a defendant must only have knowledge that would cause a 
reasonable person in his situation to conclude that the chemicals 
he sold would be used to manufacture a controlled substance.82  
In United States v. Kaur,83 an undercover DEA agent purchased 
a large amount of pseudoephedrine from defendant’s convenience 
store and, as a result, the defendant was charged with violating 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).84  The defendant was convicted after the 
district court instructed the jury that “reasonable cause to 
believe” does not equate to actual knowledge but rather allows 
the government to prove that a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would have been aware that the 
pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance.85  The Ninth Circuit upheld these jury instructions, 
stating that if “reasonable cause to believe” required the 
government to prove actual knowledge, having both “knowing” 
and “having reasonable cause to believe” clauses in the statute 
would be redundant.86  The court further explained that 
interpretations that cause statutory language to be excessive 




80 Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2.  
81 Galvan, 407 F.3d at 957.  
82 See United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2004). 
83 382 F.3d 1155.  
84 Id. at 1156.  
85 Id. at 1157. 
86 Id.; see also infra Part III.B.2. 
87 Kaur, 382 F.3d at 1157 (“[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes 
that render language superfluous.” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253 (1992))).  
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holding that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) 
involves both a subjective and objective inquiry, and “having 
reasonable cause to believe” is a distinct mens rea that differs 
from actual knowledge.88  
3. The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit concurred with the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits.89  In United States v. Prather,90 the defendant sold large 
quantities of pseudoephedrine through the mail; typically, he 
sold cases of seventy-five 1,000-tablet bottles at a time to 
individuals and stores providing drug paraphernalia.91  In 1995, 
the defendant received a letter from a law firm explaining that 
his high-risk activities may result in a criminal prosecution, yet 
he failed to close down his mail-order business.92  The defendant 
was convicted of ten counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2).93  
On appeal, the defendant’s district court conviction was upheld, 
even though the government did not prove that the defendant 
had actual knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold would be 
used to manufacture methamphetamine.94  The district court 
judge explained to the jury, “the focus is not on what it is proven 
that [the defendant] actually knew.  Here the standard is[,] based 
on what he did know, would a reasonable person . . . have cause 
to believe that the pseudoephedrine in the count would be 
diverted.”95  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and 
held that the jury instructions were not erroneous, indicating 
that the mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) does not 
compel the government to prove actual knowledge.96 
C. An Undecided Court 
In United States v. Khattab,97 the Seventh Circuit noted the 
split amongst its sister courts regarding the “knowing or having 
 
88 Id.  
89 See United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000).  
90 205 F.3d 1265.  
91 Id. at 1268.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. Prather was charged and convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(2). See supra 
note 45. 
94 See Prather, 205 F.3d at 1271. 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 536 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008).  
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reasonable cause to believe” mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).98  
In Khattab, the defendant unknowingly engaged in a series of 
negotiations with undercover DEA agents to purchase l00 boxes 
of pseudoephedrine from them.99  Each conversation was 
recorded, and in one instance, the agent mentioned using the 
pseudoephedrine to make a different substance; the defendant 
explained that those who use the “narcotic substance” created 
from the pseudoephedrine “sniff it” or “mix it with the baking 
soda.”100  When the defendant met the undercover agents to 
purchase the pseudoephedrine, the DEA agents identified 
themselves, and the defendant was arrested.101  The defendant 
was tried and convicted of one count of violating 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), and the district court held that the 
prosecution’s evidence was “just barely” satisfactory to prove that 
the defendant knew his purchasers would use the 
pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine.102  On 
appeal, the defendant argued the evidence presented against him 
was not sufficient to prove actual knowledge.103  The Seventh 
Circuit, albeit mentioning the existence of the circuit split 
discussed above, failed to adopt an interpretation of the statute’s 
mens rea requirement.  Rather, the court held that the defendant 
had genuine knowledge that the pseudoephedrine he sold would 
be used to produce methamphetamine.  The court commented 
that because the defendant’s actual knowledge would have made 
him guilty under either of the conflicting constructions, the case 
at bar was “not the proper vehicle for [it] to weigh in on the 
circuit split regarding the proper mens rea standard for 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2).”104  
III. 21 U.S.C. § 841(C)(2) SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A MIXED 
SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
This Part maintains that various canons of statutory 
interpretation confirm the view that the mens rea requirement of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) should be construed as a mixed 
 
98 Id. at 768–69.  
99 Id. at 766.  
100 Id. at 767. 
101 Id. at 766.  
102 Id. at 768.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 769. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
1114 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1099   
subjective/objective standard.  Section A provides a brief 
description of the function of mens rea in criminal law and 
outlines the differences between a subjective and objective 
standard of guilt.  Section B explores different canons of 
statutory construction and explains why each supports a mixed 
standard.  Finally, Section C outlines and counters the argument 
made by proponents of a wholly subjective standard.  
A. Mens Rea 
In American criminal jurisprudence, a crime consists of two 
distinct elements: the actus reus, a physical act or omission, and 
the mens rea, the defendant’s mental state.105  Determining the 
defendant’s menal state is essential for conviction; the American 
legal system holds steadfast to the belief that one must not be 
convicted for purely accidental acts.106  While certain crimes 
require that the government prove guilt by inquiring into the 
defendant’s psyche and determining that his illegal act was 
accompanied by an evil mind,107 other crimes allow conviction 
based on a showing of objective fault.108  Objective fault requires 
that the prosecution prove what a reasonably prudent person in 
the defendant’s situation would have known or how he would 
have acted,109 while a requirement of subjective fault necessitates 
that the prosecution prove what the defendant himself actually 





105 DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 127. 
106 See United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (explaining that 
an injury can only be a crime if the actor had a culpable mindset when committing 
the act); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (2009) (1881) 
(noting that “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being 
kicked,” to explain that one should not be prosecuted for a mere accident).  
107 See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a 
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 436 (1982) (using murder as an 
example of a crime that requires the government to prove that the defendant’s guilty 
hand was accompanied by a guilty mind).  
108 DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 275–76 (discussing that, occasionally, a 
defendant’s conduct is viewed from an objective point of view).  
109 See id. at 275 (explaining that the “reasonable man” governs objectivity in 
the criminal law).  
110 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 340 (2000) (categorizing “actual” 
and “subjective” as one in the same). 
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prosecution in a criminal trial always has the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
requisite mental state.111 
Statutory crimes typically employ certain words to articulate 
the mens rea requirement.  Common terms include intentionally, 
knowingly, willfully, recklessly, and negligently;112 each requires 
that the prosecution prove something different to achieve a 
conviction.  Although these words and their accompanying 
definitions are not uniform throughout American jurisdictions,113 
the Model Penal Code provides definitions that are widely 
accepted.114  Under the Model Penal Code, “knowingly” requires 
the prosecution to prove the defendant’s subjective fault—that he 
was nearly certain that a particular result would occur.115  In 
contrast, the phrase “having reasonable cause to believe” is not 
defined in the Model Penal Code.116  The circuit split highlights 
the fact that perhaps this mens rea is not as clear as 
“knowingly.”117  
B. Statutory Interpretation  
1. The Plain Meaning Rule 
When Congress does not explicitly define the words or 
phrases it uses in a statute, one must look to established canons 
of statutory interpretation.  To determine the plain meaning of a 
 
111 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 738 (2006) (explaining that in a criminal trial, 
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant satisfied the statute’s mens rea requirement).  
112 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 129–44 (5th ed. 
2006) (listing and explaining oft-used mens rea words). 
113 See DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 160 (noting that there are “countless” mens 
rea expressions used across different jurisdictions).  
114 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2001) (defining the requirements for culpability 
under “purposely,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” and “negligently” mens reas).  
115 Id. § 2.02(2)(b). 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such 
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, 
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a 
result. 
Id.  
116 See id. § 2.02. 
117 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the debate 
amongst the circuits regarding whether the mens rea “having reasonable cause to 
believe” requires subjective or objective knowledge).  
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statute, the first step is to examine the language of the statute 
itself.118  If the statutory language plainly and unequivocally 
establishes its meaning, looking beyond this language is 
unnecessary.119  However, if the language of the statute is 
unclear or ambiguous and thus, fails to plainly establish its 
meaning, one must turn to the legislative history of the 
statute.120  The Supreme Court has frequently followed this plain 
language rule, explaining that if the wording of a statute has a 
clear and unambiguous definition, courts need not look further 
than the statute’s language to discern its meaning.121  
Dictionaries are a key tool in discerning the plain meaning of 
words or phrases used in a statute.122  The dictionary definitions 
of the word “or” provide keen insight regarding the correct 
interpretation of “knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “or” as “a disjunctive 
particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one 
among two or more things . . . .  [A]n alternative between 
different or unlike things.”123  Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary describes “or” as “used as a function word 
to indicate an alternative.”124  The plain meaning of the word “or” 
 
118 See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009) (discussing that 
statutory interpretation always begins with the ordinary meaning of the language); 
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is 
complete.’ ”). 
119 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 253–54; see also United States v. One “Piper” Aztec 
“F” De Luxe Model 250 PA 23 Aircraft Bearing Serial No. 27-7654057, 321 F.3d 355, 
359 (3d Cir. 2003) (determining that when Congress’s purpose is expressed in 
unambiguous terms, that language is conclusive).  
120 See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (noting that the 
Supreme Court does “not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is 
clear”). 
121 See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1063–64 (2009) (“[W]e must 
first determine whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous. If it is, we 
must apply the statute according to its terms.” (internal citations omitted)); Gitlitz v. 
Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 220 (2001) (noting that when the statute’s language is plain, 
resort to policy analysis is unnecessary); Comm’r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 
(1993) (explaining that the first step in statutory interpretation is to look to the 
ordinary meaning of the language); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 241 (1989) (“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] 
begins where all such inquires must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”). 
122 Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216–17, 219 (2002) (using a dictionary to 
determine the plain meaning of “pending” when attempting to interpret 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2006)).  
123 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990). 
124 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 872 (11th ed. 2007). 
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unambiguously demonstrates that when it is placed between two 
words or phrases, it is used to indicate different, independent 
concepts.125 
These definitions of the word “or” support the position that 
“having reasonable cause to believe” should not be interpreted 
similarly to “knowingly.”  Instead, it should be interpreted as an 
unlike, different standard—the objective standard.  The 
disjunctive term is a signal that implies that only one of the 
enumerated requirements must be fulfilled and additionally, that 
the listed terms have distinct meanings.126 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), if “having reasonable cause to 
believe” is the same as “knowing,” then no diversity exists 
between the terms before and after “or,” since both “knowing” 
and “having reasonable cause to believe” will require the 
government to prove the defendant’s subjective knowledge.  This 
interpretation runs counter to the ordinary dictionary meanings 
of “or.”  If Congress intended the statute to have only one, 
subjective mens rea requirement, “or” would not have been the 
appropriate word choice; instead, “and” would have been used to 
signify that both mentes reae necessitate subjective fault.  “And” 
is typically understood as indicating that the listed requirements 
are of the same type.127  To ensure that the plain meaning of the 
statutory language is effectuated, “knowing or having reasonable 
cause to believe” must be interpreted as allowing a conviction 
based on subjective awareness or, in the alternative, a 
defendant’s objective knowledge.  
a. Legislative Intent 
The legislative intent of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) also 
demonstrates that Congress purposely armed the statute with 
two distinct mentes reae.  When interpreting the language of a 
statute, a court may attempt to decipher what the legislature 
 
125 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978) (explaining that 
when a list of words are written in the disjunctive, it is implied that each has a 
different meaning); YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (discussing that “or” is used to 
demonstrate the existence of an alternative).  
126 KIM, supra note 125.  
127 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 124, at 46 
(defining “and” as “used as a function word to indicate connection or addition . . . of 
items within the same class or type”). 
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planned to accomplish when it decided to enact the statute.128  
The congressional proceedings and debates surrounding the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and specifically 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), 
shed light on Congress’s goals.  During the proceedings, 
Representative Kolbe explained that due to the stark increase in 
drug use in America, more rigorous law enforcement measures 
were needed to control drug production and manufacturing 
throughout the country.129  The Act was drafted to serve that 
purpose by substantially enhancing the government’s ability to 
control the transportation of precursor chemicals that are used to 
manufacture illicit drugs, such as methamphetamine.130  
Similarly, Senator Dole noted that one-hundred percent of 
illegally-used methamphetamine is manufactured in the United 
States, and the Act would provide the government with the tools 
necessary to combat and eradicate methamphetamine production 
and use.131  Moreover, Representative Manton explained that the 
legislation increased the amount of resources available to 
prosecute and convict people for drug-related offenses and 
allowed the government to strictly scrutinize the distribution of 
legal chemicals that are used to manufacture illicit narcotics.132  
Senator Rudman echoed this statement, describing the Act as a 
 
128 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512, 515 (1990) (referring to the 
Senate report to determine the “primary objective” of various amendments to the 
Medicaid law); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 
(1968) (noting that interpreting a statute in light of its legislative history and 
general objectives facilitates a proper construction). 
129 See 134 CONG. REC. 22,637 (1988) (statement of Rep. Kolbe). 
130 See id. at 22,618 (statement of Rep. English) (noting that the bill would 
provide the government with more tools to stop the diversion of chemicals from 
legitimate enterprises into illegal channels); id. at 22,650 (statement of Rep. Bates) 
(noting that the bill would enhance the government’s control over precursor 
chemicals to methamphetamine).  
131 See 134 CONG. REC. 32,634 (1988) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
132 See id. at 22,646 (statement of Rep. Manton). Rep. Manton stated: 
[T]his legislation will supplement our previous anti-drug efforts by 
strengthening existing law and providing new resources in our fight 
against drugs . . . . [W]e will finally place controls on many of those 
chemicals commonly available which are used in the manufacturing and 
processing of illegal narcotics . . . [,] increase our assistance to State and 
local drug enforcement by increasing their overall authorization . . . [, and] 
broaden the jurisdiction of several branches of the Federal Government to 
play a wider role in drug enforcement. 
Id. 
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“major new effort” that would prevent legal precursor chemicals 
from being diverted to channels of illicit drug production.133 
The congressional records clearly suggest that a major facet 
of the bill was to stop legal chemicals from being used for illicit 
purposes—namely, narcotic production—in an attempt to ensure 
the safety of the United States.134  Members of Congress often 
discussed increasing the number of resources available to the 
government to combat drug manufacturing and use.  By 
providing two different mens rea requirements to satisfy a 
conviction, the Act does just that.  Allowing the prosecution to 
prove guilt on one of two bases widens the scope of criminal 
liability by criminalizing not only subjective knowledge but also 
objective awareness that the chemicals one distributes will be 
used to manufacture a controlled substance.  Additionally, the 
legislation was aimed at eradicating drug manufacturing, 
distribution, and use in America, as affirmed by President 
Reagan in his remarks on signing the Act.135  The President 
discussed “clos[ing] rank on those who continue to provide drugs” 
by strengthening the government’s power and ability “to 
eliminate from America’s streets and towns the scourge of illicit 
drugs.”136  If 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) is interpreted as requiring 
subjective knowledge, the government is unable to “close rank” 
on those who fail to take notice of the obviousness of their 
actions, when the reasonably prudent person would have known 
the chemicals would be used to produce a controlled substance.  
Construing the statute to contain two distinct mens rea 
requirements effectuates the goal of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 




133 134 CONG. REC. 32,630–31 (1988) (statement of Sen. Rudman). 
134 See id. at 32,630 (statement of Sen. Rudman) (noting that the drug problem 
in America was “one of the most serious threats” to national security, and the Act 
would serve to restore safety to the United States by diminishing drug production 
and use); id. at 32,636 (statement of Sen. Chiles) (discussing the grave threat that 
drugs posed to the security of the United States). 
135 Remarks on Signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, at 1522–
23 (describing the “ultimate destination” of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 as 
making America drug free).  
136 Id. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1099 (2010) 
1120 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1099   
The sequence of changes in the statutory language that 
occurred throughout congressional proceedings is also telling.137  
As a general matter, the Supreme Court attaches significance to 
Congress’s choice to use one House’s proposed version of a 
statute’s language over another House’s model.138  For example, 
in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court found 
Congress’s choice of the Senate’s proposed definition of 
“navigable waters” and rejection of the House’s extremely 
persuasive for determining how the Clean Water Act should be 
interpreted.139  Here, the statutory language of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) underwent two significant changes 
throughout the legislative process.140  The Senate’s first proposed 
amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) included only one mens rea 
requirement: knowing.141  The House proposed to amend the 
Senate’s language on October 21, 1988 and added “reasonable 
cause to believe” as a second mens rea.142  Congress chose to 
adopt the House’s version.  When 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) was 
enacted, both terms appeared in the statute.143  Similar to 
Riverside, here Congress had the opportunity to choose between 
two varying drafts of the amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), 
and it decided to enact the House’s version.  This final version 
indicates Congress’s intent to expand the reach of the statute 
past the scope originally proposed in the Senate’s amendment.144  
If “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to believe” both meant 
 
137 See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739–41 (2001) (examining changes to the 
language of a bill as a tool in statutory construction); United States v. Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952) (looking to the “specific history of the 
legislative process” of a statute aids in arriving at an appropriate meaning). 
138 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1985). 
139 See id. at 137. 
140 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
141 134 CONG. REC. S15,785 (daily ed. Oct 13, 1988). The proposed amendment 
read: 
Section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841) is amended by 
striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new 
subsections: (d) Any person who knowingly or 
intentionally . . . (2) possesses or distributes a listed chemical knowing that 
the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance . . . . 
Id. 
142 134 CONG. REC. H11108 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). 
143 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6055, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4318 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(c)(2) (West 2011)).  
144 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258–59 (2004) 
(“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to 
have real and substantial effect.” (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995))). 
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actual knowledge, the amendment would have lacked meaning, 
been duplicative, and served no cogent purpose.  Congress, 
however, always intends its statutory amendments to be 
substantive and significant.145  Congress’s decision to adopt the 
House’s proposed amendment over the Senate’s, coupled with 
this fact about statutory amendments, support the conclusion 
that Congress intended “knowing” and “having reasonable cause 
to believe” to be independent, alternate mentes reae.  
b. “Having Reasonable Cause To Believe” Is a Term of Art 
When attempting to decipher the meaning of a particular 
statute, courts also consider whether Congress has explicitly 
defined the term or phrase.146  When a word or phrase has been 
defined elsewhere in the United States Code, it becomes a “term 
of art.”147  Unless circumstances indicate otherwise, that 
definition is controlling.148  The Supreme Court has noted that if 
applying the definition to the statute at hand would present an 
“obvious incongruit[y]” or depart from the statute’s purpose, then 
the circumstances indicate that definition is not controlling.149   
Currently, “reasonable cause to believe” is defined in 
12 U.S.C. § 4003(c)(1) as requiring “the existence of facts which 
would cause a well-grounded belief in the mind of a reasonable 
person.”150  Here, no perverse implications would result from 
defining the same phrase in 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) in the same 
manner.  Title 12, section 4003(c)(1) was codified in 1987; thus, 
Congress arguably knew how it had previously defined 
“reasonable cause to believe” when it decided to use that same 
language in 1988.151  With this knowledge, Congress decidedly 
employed the term when drafting and enacting 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2). 
 
145 See id. 
146 See KIM, supra note 125, at 5. 
147 See id. at 5–6 (noting that when Congress has previously defined a word or 
phrase in a section of the United States Code, that word or phrase is a “term of art”).  
148 See id. (explaining that when a term is defined in the United States Code, 
that definition is to be applied when the word or phrase is used elsewhere in the 
Code, so long as the definition is applicable in the circumstances).  
149 Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949). 
150 12 U.S.C. § 4003(c)(1) (2006); see also Fort v. Smith, 407 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980) (identifying “reasonable cause to believe” as a term of art). 
151 See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 496 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (noting that it is safe 
to assume that Congress was cognizant of existing law when enacting legislation). 
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2. Statutory Language Should Not Be Construed To Render 
Any Part Superfluous 
The maxim that courts should avoid interpretations that 
render any part of the statutory language superfluous has 
remained constant from the nineteenth century until today.152  
This rule of statutory interpretation serves an even more 
important purpose when interpreting a criminal statute.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Ratzlaf v. United States,153 judges should 
be even more reluctant to treat statutory language as mere 
surplusage when the words are defining an element of a criminal 
offense.154  In Bailey v. United States,155 the Supreme Court 
explained that when Congress places two terms in a statute, it 
assumes that Congress intended each word to have its own 
“nonsuperfluous” meaning.156  Ensuring that a statute is 
construed to avoid rendering any part of the statute superfluous 
is well-established in the Supreme Court.157   
Here, if “reasonable cause to believe” requires actual 
knowledge, it is an entirely redundant, unnecessary phrase, as 
“knowingly” already requires that the defendant have a 
subjective awareness that the chemicals he distributes will be 
used to manufacture a controlled substance.158  Similar to the 
 
152 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2009) (noting that 
a statute should be construed in such a way that each provision is given a meaning 
and no part of the statute will be insignificant); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“[C]ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that 
render language superfluous.”); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 
552, 562 (1990) (noting that courts should be extremely hesitant to interpret a 
statute so as to make any words or provisions unnecessary); Montclair v. Ramdsell, 
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (stating that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies 
that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”).  
153 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
154 See id. at 140–41 (explaining that judges should attempt to ensure that each 
word in a statute has consequence, especially when the statute at hand is criminal).  
155 516 U.S. 137 (1995).  
156 Id. at 146 (noting that when Congress decided to use two different terms, it 
did not intend for either term to be excessive). 
157 See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) 
(stating that “of course” the court attempts to interpret statutes so no word is 
rendered unnecessary). 
158 See United States v. Galvan, 407 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining 
that if having “reasonable cause to believe” requires subjective knowledge, the 
phrase is superfluous and unnecessary); United States v. Kaur, 382 F.3d 1155, 1157 
(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that because “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to 
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statute referenced in Bailey, we may presume that not only did 
Congress purposely use two different phrases when drafting 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) but that the legislature intended each term 
to have its own distinct meaning, especially since the statute 
defines a criminal offense.159  Congress chose to adopt the latter 
of the two language options.  By using two different phrases in 
the statute, Congress deliberately chose to broaden the 
application of the statute beyond actual knowledge and provide 
two different bases for conviction.160  If Congress intended to 
provide the government with only one avenue for conviction, it 
would have, and could have, written the statute to ensure such a 
construction; instead, Congress worded the statute to plainly 
present “knowing” and “having reasonable cause to believe” as 
two individual, separate alternatives.161  
3. Mischief Approach  
Another tool often used in statutory interpretation is the 
“mischief” approach, also commonly know as the “purposivist” 
approach, which is considered the most flexible and traditional 
method.162  Under this doctrine, a court first determines the ill 
that the legislature was attempting to remedy by passing the 
statute.  Next, the statute is interpreted in a manner that 
“attack[s] that mischief as manifested under current 
circumstances.”163 
This approach has been recognized for over four-hundred 
years.  In 1584, the English judge presiding over Heydon’s Case164 
explained that “the office of all the Judges is always to make 
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance 
 
believe” are obviously “two distinct alternatives,” having “reasonable cause to 
believe” would be redundant if it is defined as actual knowledge).  
159 See Bailey, 510 U.S. at 146 (“We assume that Congress used two terms 
because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”); see 
also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140–41. 
160 See Bailey, 510 U.S. at 146 (explaining that when Congress uses two different 
terms in a statute, the language should be interpreted as allowing two independent 
bases upon which the government may charge a defendant).  
161 See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says there.”). 
162 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332 n.40 (1990). 
163 Id. (citing Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory 
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1269–72 (1947)). 
164 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. 1584). 
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the remedy” that “Parliament hath resolved and appointed to 
cure the disease of the commonwealth.”165  The trend was still 
dominant three-hundred years later.166  In United States v. 
Boisdoré’s Heirs,167 Chief Justice Taney noted that judges must 
always interpret a statute according to the policy that drove its 
enactment.168  The Supreme Court has remained loyal to this 
approach, noting time and time again that a statute should be 
interpreted in a way that will remedy the harm that the 
legislature sought to eradicate.169  The purposivist approach 
instructs a court to consider how the particular mischief has 
evolved since the statute’s enactment.170   
When Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, it 
consistently explained that the purpose of the legislation was to 
ensure that drugs no longer ravaged the safety of the United 
States.  Senators Byrd and Rudman noted that the presence of 
drugs in America was “one of the most serious threats” to the 
country, and the Act’s purpose was to restore safety to the United 
States by eradicating drug production, manufacturing, and 




165 Id. at 639. 
166 See, e.g., United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850). 
167 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113. 
168 See id. at 122 (“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single 
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.”). 
169 See Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171 (2009) (explaining that 
“interpretation is a multifaceted enterprise” that includes construing statutory 
language to effectuate the legislature’s policy); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 
844, 845 (2005) (explaining that deciphering the “purpose” of a statute is a “staple” 
of statutory interpretation); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443–48 (1988) 
(noting that the “answer” to correctly interpreting a statute is in the purpose of the 
act); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982) (citing Nat’l 
Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)); SEC v. 
Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350–51 (1943) (noting that statutory text should be interpreted 
to further the generally expressed legislative policy). 
170 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 162. 
171 134 CONG. REC. S17,300-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statements of Sen. Byrd 
and Sen. Rudman); see also id. (statement of Sen. McConnell) (explaining that the 
bill sought to notify drug traffickers that the United States government would no 
longer allow drugs to be the cause of innumerable deaths, and noting that the 
legislation aimed to crack down on those who “finance” the enemy); id. (statement of 
Sen. Chiles) (noting that drugs pose a serious threat to national security); 134 CONG. 
REC. H7074-02 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1988) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (commenting that 
drugs are “tearing” apart the nation). 
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use was having on the security of America’s family units and 
economy, explaining that drugs cause a stark increase in 
criminal activities.  Senator Rockefeller stated, 
[w]e have seen drugs literally rip thousands of American 
families asunder.  Nationally, substance abuse is a factor in 90 
percent of all teen pregnancies, 60 percent of all teen suicides 
and homicides, and 90 percent of all incest cases. 
. . . . 
It is estimated that the economic costs associated with drug 
abuse in the United States could be as high as $100 billion a 
year in lost productivity, associated health care costs, and the 
need for increased law enforcement. 
. . . .  
The National Institute of Justice found that of 2,000 persons 
arrested for serious crimes last year, 70 percent tested positive 
for drug use.  More than half of the criminal cases pending 
before our courts involve drug-related crimes.172 
Today, drugs also endanger the protection of the United 
States via the relationship between drug trafficking and 
international terrorism.  In 1988, Representative Smith noted 
that there was a “connection between narcotics traffickers and 
terrorists,” yet the issue of narco-terrorism was not nearly as 
prominent and glaring as it is today.173  Over the past two 
decades, the connection between drug transactions and 
international terrorism has significantly strengthened and poses 
a genuine threat to the safety of the United States.174  When 
Congress passed the Act, the ill that it sought to remedy was the 
negative impact that drug trafficking had on the safety of the 




172 134 CONG. REC. S17,301-01 (statement by Sen. Rockefeller). 
173 134 CONG. REC. H7074-02 (statement by Rep. Smith); see also DAVEED 
GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & KYLE DABRUZZI, CTR. FOR POLICING TERRORISM, THE 
CONVERGENCE OF CRIME AND TERROR: LAW ENFORCEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND 
PERILS 2–4 (2007) (noting that “[t]errorist groups have derived a great deal of profit 
from the illegal drug trade” and describing the relationship between 
methamphetamine trafficking and the Shia terrorist group Hezbollah); David 
Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 5, 2005), 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm (describing the 
connection between the Madrid subway bombing and MDMA trafficking). 
174 See GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3–5 (commenting on 
the danger to the United States caused by the link between drug traffickers and 
terrorists). 
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and the rapid growth of international terrorist organizations 
drugs specifically threaten the security of the United States by 
financing the operation of terrorist groups.175 
Former Attorney General John Ashcroft once stated, 
“[t]errorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic 
plague—they thrive in the same conditions, support each other, 
and feed off each other.”176  A “narco-terrorist organization” is “an 
organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug 
trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets 
with the intention to influence.”177  Similarly, “narco-terrorism” is 
the use of drug trafficking as a way to provide financial support 
to terrorist organizations.178  Currently, narco-terrorism is 
prevalent within the borders of the United States, as profits from 
narcotics transactions are used to finance terrorist 
organizations;179 twelve of the thirty-six organizations on the 
State Department’s terrorist organizations list have been linked 
to the international drug trade.180  Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and 
Hamas each receive financing from narcotics trafficking in the 
United States.181 
Specifically, a strong connection between methamphetamine 
trafficking and terrorist organizations has been uncovered within 
the past decade.182  A study of jihadist terrorism since 9/11 
 
175 See id. at 3–4. 
176 John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, DEA/Drug Enforcement 
Rollout (Mar. 19, 2002) (prepared remarks), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/ag/speeches/2002/031902newsconferencedeaenforcementrollout.htm. 
President George W. Bush nearly echoed this sentiment, stating, “It’s so important 
for Americans to know that the traffic in drugs finances the work of terror, 
sustaining terrorists . . . . Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit 
acts of murder.” RACHEL EHRENHELD, FUNDING EVIL: HOW TERRORISM IS FINANCED 
AND HOW TO STOP IT 3–4 (2005). 
177 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 4. 
178 Id. 
179 Larry Cunningham, The Border Search Exception as Applied to Exit and 
Export Searches: A Global Conceptualization, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 32 (2007).  
180 Id. at 32–33; see also Sara Carter, Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into 
U.S., WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the DEA believes that sixty 
percent of terrorist groups are connected with illicit narcotics trafficking).   
181 See EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 12. 
182 Methamphetamine is a schedule II controlled substance. U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Admin., Methamphetamine, http://usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.html 
(last visted Nov. 12, 2010). Methamphetamine is an addictive illegal stimulant that 
may be snorted, smoked, or injected intravenously by users. See id. Common street 
names for methamphetamine include, but are not limited to, “speed,” “meth,” “poor 
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revealed that terrorist groups find financial support through 
methamphetamine sales in the United States.183  In January 
2002, Operation Mountain Express III, a federal investigation, 
resulted in charges against 136 people, and the seizure of 179 
pounds of methamphetamine and thirty-six tons of 
pseudoephedrine, a listed precursor chemical to 
methamphetamine.184  A large portion of the profits from the 
drug ring was sent to the Middle East to support terrorist 
organizations.185  In thwarting yet another Hezbollah drug ring, 
the DEA arrested 300 people for methamphetamine sales and 
seized 181 pounds of methamphetamine, thirty tons of 
pseudoephedrine, and nine methamphetamine laboratories.186  
The DEA concluded that profits from this drug ring were being 
used in support of the Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda, and Hamas terrorist 
operations.187  Similarly, Operation Green Quest, a “task force on 
terrorist financing” designed to destroy the financial sources of 
terrorism, uncovered instances of proceeds from 
methamphetamine trafficking being sent to support Hezbollah.188 
Furthermore, ecstasy trafficking is another source of funding 
for terrorist groups.189  The Madrid Cell, the terrorist group that 
 
man’s cocaine,” “crystal,” and “shabu.” Id. Methamphetamine highs may last for as 
long as half a day and have toxic repercussions on the brain; high doses can cause 
the body’s temperature to spike to lethal levels and may cause convulsions. See id. 
Long-term use often causes addiction, violent behavior, anxiety, insomnia, 
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal tendencies, and depression. See id. 
Methamphetamine recipes are readily available on the Internet, thereby allowing 
anyone with Internet access the opportunity to learn how to manufacture the drug. 
Simple Ways To Make Methamphetamine, http://www.simple-ways-to-make-
methamphetamine.com/crank-meth-recipe-red-white-blue-process.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2010). 
183 EHRENFELD, supra note 176. 
184 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3. 
185 Id. 
186 See EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 11–12; see also U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., Maps of Methamphetamine Lab Incidents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ 
concern/map_lab_seizures.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (observing that since 
January 1999, 123,400 methamphetamine labs have been seized). 
187 EHRENFELD, supra note 176, at 12. 
188 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 3. 
189 See Kaplan, supra note 173. Ecstasy, or MDMA, a schedule I controlled 
substance, is an illegal drug that functions as a stimulant and a psychedelic. U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Admin., MDMA (Ecstasy), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/ 
mdma.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). Users experience euphoria, and reduced 
inhibitions, heightened energy and sexuality, and distortions in time and perception. 
See id. Street names include, but are not limited to, “XTC,” “E,” “X,” “hug drug,” and 
“disco biscuit.” See id. Ecstasy use may cause liver, kidney, cardiovascular system 
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arranged the 2004 subway bombing in Madrid, received much of 
its financing from the proceeds of ecstasy sales.190  The Cell’s 
leaders called drug sales “a weapon of jihad.”191  The terrorist 
gang financed the subway bombing with money earned from 
trafficking in ecstasy.  When police raided the home of a Madrid 
Cell member, 125,800 ecstasy pills were seized.192  
Currently, narcotics trafficking poses a substantial threat to 
the safety of the United States, as terrorist organizations use the 
profits of methamphetamine and ecstasy sales to finance 
terrorist operations.193  Since the statute’s enactment in 1988, the 
damage caused by controlled substances has evolved into 
endangering the safety of the United States by way of narco-
terrorist organizations.194  Pursuant to the mischief approach to 
statutory construction, the “knowing or having reasonable cause 
to believe” requisite mens rea of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) must be 
interpreted with this threat in mind; specifically, it must be 
construed in light of the recently-formed connection between 
narcotics trafficking and international terrorism.195  Since 
Congress passed 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) to diminish the threat that 
controlled substances posed to the United States, its language 
should be interpreted to further that objective. 
To effectuate Congress’s intent to protect the country from 
the danger of narcotics, the statute must be interpreted broadly.  
If the statute is construed narrowly as a wholly subjective 
standard, the government will be unable to safeguard the United 
States from those who fail to take notice of the fact that the 
chemicals they sell will be used to manufacture a controlled 
substance, when the reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position would have been aware of his purchaser’s intent.  
Construing the statute to limit the government’s reach directly 
interferes with the legislature’s intent—that is, to protect the 
United States from terrorism by eliminating terrorist drug 
money ties—by making an entire class of people often involved in 
 
failure, muscle tension, nausea, blurred vision, faintness, depression, and trouble 
concentrating. See id. 
190 See Kaplan, supra note 173 (describing the connection between ecstasy sales 
and the subway bombing). 
191 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & DABRUZZI, supra note 173, at 5. 
192 Kaplan, supra note 173. 
193 See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
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drug trafficking immume from convinction.  Alternatively, 
interpreting the statute as a mixed subjective/objective standard 
provides the government with two bases upon which it may 
convict a defendant for drug trafficking.  As a result, this will 
enhance the government’s ability effectively thwart terrorist 
activities by allowing the prosecution to convict a larger number 
of dangerous criminals.  This interpretation is consistent with 
Congress’s attempt to safeguard the country from terrorism, a 
substantial danger caused by narcotics. 
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Erroneous Counterargument  
Proponents of an entirely subjective standard, namely the 
Tenth Circuit, argue that one’s guilt cannot be predicated on the 
beliefs of a hypothetical, reasonable man but instead must take 
into account the precise knowledge of the defendant himself.196  
The Tenth Circuit noted that “[g]uilt is personal,” and a 
defendant cannot fairly be forced to accept liability simply 
because a hypothetical person would have had knowledge of 
certain facts.197  This view, however, is based on a flawed 
perception of the criminal law.  In fact, there are statutes that 
criminalize actions without ever inquiring into the defendant’s 
state of mind198 or by determining what a reasonable person in 
the defendant’s situation would have known.199  A prime example 
is statutory rape; the criminal law punishes a defendant for 
engaging in intercourse with a child under a certain age, 
regardless of whether the defendant thought or a reasonable 
person would have thought the child was older than the requisite 
age.200  The defendant’s mens rea is irrelevant to conviction, 
proving that guilt certainly does not always require an 
examination of the defendant’s actual, subjective knowledge.  
Similarly, the negligence mens rea is widely used throughout the 
criminal law.  When employed, the negligence standard requires 
only that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would 
have known certain facts or acted in a certain way.201  Criminally 
 
196 See United States v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2000). 
197 Id. at 1269. 
198 See DRESSLER, supra note 112, at 156 (explaining that “strict liability” crimes 
impose liability without a mens rea requirement). 
199 See id. at 131 (noting that a negligence mens rea punishes a defendant “for 
his failure to live up to the standards of the fictional ‘reasonable person’ ”).  
200 See id. at 157–58. 
201 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
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negligent homicide is one such example:  To be convicted of this 
crime, the Model Penal Code explains that the prosecution need 
only prove that the defendant acted in contrast to how a 
reasonable person would have acted in his situation.202  Thus, the 
Tenth Circuit deviates from the well-established tenet in 
criminal law jurisprudence that guilt does not always have to be 
based upon the defendant’s subjective knowledge but in fact can 
based on the knowledge of the reasonably prudent man.  
CONCLUSION 
The mens rea requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)—
“knowing or having reasonable cause to believe”—must be 
interpreted to allow either subjective or objective proof as to the 
mens rea of the defendant and calls upon the Supreme Court to 
reverse the Tenth Circuit’s contrary opinion.  The prosecution 
may prove the defendant’s guilt either by demonstrating that he 
had actual knowledge that the listed chemicals he distributed 
would be used to manufacture a controlled substance or that a 
reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s situation would 
have had such an understanding.  Congress enacted the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which authorized the current language 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), to eradicate drug manufacturing and use 
in America and focused on providing the government with the 
necessary resources to stop legal drugs from being used to 
manufacture illicit substances.  Congress intended to ensure the 
safety of the United States by waging an aggressive attack on 
those who supply and use drugs.  The proposed interpretation, 
already adopted by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, is 
overwhelmingly supported by the legislative history of the 
statute, the canon of statutory interpretation that holds that no 
language in a statute should be rendered superfluous, and the 
“mischief approach” to statutory construction.  Each of these 
fundamental tools, used regularly by the Supreme Court, 
 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering 
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the actor’s situation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
202 See id. § 210.4. 
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convincingly confirm that “knowing or having reasonable cause 
to believe” must be understood as allowing a conviction based on 
the defendant’s subjective or objective knowledge.  The Supreme 
Court should resolve the circuit split and adopt the correct 
interpretation of the mens rea requirement of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2): a mixed subjective/objective standard.  
 
